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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS



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11 April 1986

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

COL GEN LOBOV: 'ETHICS' OF 'ONE-MAN COMMAND'

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jan 86 p 2

[Article by Col Gen V. Lobov, commander of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District, 27th CPSU Congress delegate: "A Commander's Ethics"]

[Text] One day Maj Gen V. Yermolenko, commander of the district's rocket forces and artillery, shared his impressions about the party meeting of N unit where he had occasion to visit. He felt that the meeting was, as they say, "charged up" and enriched with valuable observations. He was pleased, for example, by the greater attention given to the personal example of the commander and leader than before, including in the moral sphere, including strict exactingness towards himself and subordinates, simplicity, modesty, accessibility, and closeness to people.

This involves the honest and pure character of a party-member commander, political worker or staff officer and the moral example and ethics of a commander and leader. Vladimir Vasilyevich undoubtedly very correctly noticed one characteristic of the atmosphere in military collectives in these days before the party congress. Indeed, the increased attention to the unity of word and deed, the rise of the role of moral example, and the importance of a leader's ethics are a characteristic sign of our times. Its sources are clear. They are in the party policy reflected in the pre-congress documents towards speeding up social and economic development of our society, in the increased demands on each of us in this regard, and in the increased role of the human factor, without which it is impossible to complete any of the tasks set forth, as emphasized in the draft CPSU Program. There is no doubt that strict observance of the norms of communist morality, which is required of a commander and supervisor by the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, and ethics, which means standards of behavior, comprise the most important elements of this factor.

Noteworthy in this light is the example of Maj Gen Yermolenko himself. He enjoys well-deserved prestige with personnel of subordinate units (chasti) and subunits (podrazdeleniya). Vladimir Vasilyevich is a highly trained specialist, a demanding leader with principles, and, at the same time, a generous and sympathetic person.

Maj Gen Yermolenko's work style is typified by a business-like efficiency, a thorough study of life in the subunits based on personal observations and by

specific work in a battery, active participation in educating personnel, and an aspiration to rely constantly on party organizations in all his activities.

Unquestionably, a commander's morals and ethics are demonstrated above all in the effectiveness of his work, in the level of combat readiness of the subunit entrusted to him, and in the organization and discipline of personnel. Such a result is achieved only based on an organic combination of high professional, political, and moral qualities. Graphic confirmation of this is the example of well-known officers in our district who have been given high state awards. These include subunit commanders Maj Ye. Korobov, Capt I. Saliy, and Sr Lt S. Kazakpayev, political workers Lt Col A. Mazharov and Lt Col V. Savelyev, and staff officers Lt Col A. Chivilev and Capt V. Kaminskiy.

A person's ideological conviction makes up the foundation of ethics and morality. It is precisely this that ensures that he will always and in everything take a clear-cut class stand and not retreat a step from the principles of communist morality, and collectivist, humanistic, active, and professional morals. This is why in resolving personnel matters the district's military council, commanders, and political organs always take into account both an officer's professional competence and the degree of his political maturity and moral training.

Neglecting these rules inevitably leads to serious costs. For example, Lt Col G. Navolokin proved to be a failure in his role as unit commander. In appointing him to the position, as the officials involved in the promotion later said, they did not "examine" the seeds of such flaws as self-conceit, arrogance, and the inclination to abuse one's official position. In the new position involving more independence, these flaws began to grow more rapidly. Unfortunately, superiors and officers of the political department were unable to set the person straight in time and did not display the proper exactingness toward him. Navolokin had to be relieved of his post.

This story is very instructive. I would especially like to emphasize the fact that Navolokin was "helped" by sychophants and flatterers, whose influence he was unable to resist. Servility and flattery are dangerous things. Even a potentially capable but politically insufficiently mature person can get caught in their sticky web. It appears that as any leader advances in his career he must realize that every new position assumes, above all, more duties and a greater responsibility, including for one's own moral make-up.

As we know, a correct combination of exactingness and respect, sensitiveness, and concern for people is of special importance for the commander responsible for both political and military matters. Everything does not turn out to be so clear as it may seem at first glance. Here, for example, is how contrasting the facets of the characteristics of Lt Col A. Nechepurenko, commander of a signal battalion, are. On the one hand, he is a professionally trained and exacting commander with initiative. On the other hand, he lacks self-control and is capable of rudely cutting short and humiliating a subordinate with a shout. Some commanders at first said he was rude and arrogant, but to make up for it he was a good commander. Such opinions cannot be called anything other than an anachronism. Experience again and again demonstrates their total unfoundedness. That is how it turned out in this

case: Nechepurenko's rudeness and arrogance resulted in a sort of barrier between himself and his deputies and subunit commanders and a worsening of the moral atmosphere in the collective. As a result, there was a decrease in the results of combat training and a weakening of discipline. This is an object lesson for those who said: but to make up for it...

The new draft Program emphasizes that the CPSU deems it necessary to continue to strengthen one-man command. This provision reflects the great trust in our command personnel and the demands on them. The professional ethics of a military commander oblige him to be persistent and exacting, and to strive for irreproachable fulfillment by subordinates of orders and instructions issued. However, no one has yet been able to achieve any noticeable success merely by virtue of authority, an indicating gesture, or unconscious pressure on people.

Life urgently demands that a commander today be a good teacher and strict comrade for subordinates, be willing to help each one, combine prescribed exactingness with concern and respect for the human dignity of service members, share with them all burdens and deprivations of military service, and serve as a model for them in the performance of military duty. We see it as our urgent task to study more thoroughly the processes taking place in the officer environment and to develop more actively here the collectivist lines, relations of friendship and comradeship, and pride in belonging to the regimental family. Closeness to people is not just closeness to the soldier. All subordinates are in need of personal contact with the leader. One must not forget that closeness in the officer environment between senior and junior officers is communicated to all personnel and helps to establish a healthy moral atmosphere in the collective.

The experience of outstanding aviation unit N, in particular, is convincing in this respect. Its commander, Lt Col N. Kudarevich, is known to be a strict, demanding commander and a skillful educator. His strong trait is the ability to be guided by public opinion and party and Komsomol organizations. The elements of his prestige include accessibility and tactfulness. He can be seen together with subordinates at the sports grounds as well as at rehearsals of amateur talent activities. He is a frequent guest at the officer dormitory and also likes to invite people to his home for a cup of tea.

A communist's ethics are active and militant. They are not acceptable as indifference and passiveness. For example, one cannot talk about a leader's moral purity if he tolerates indulgences in combat training and attempts to exaggerate what has been achieved and slur over deficiencies. A most important indicator of a person's moral maturity is his ability to tell people the truth no matter how bitter it may be, admit to shortcomings, and energetically strive to eliminate them.

Today is a time of bold decisions and energetic actions and raises with special acuteness the question of unity of word and deed and the ability to undertake execution of decisions made without sway and strive for a high end result. An indicator of an active moral position today is, first of all, a concentration on deeds and decisive support of everything new and progressive that comes with time, and not being afraid to reject everything that has



outlived its use, inertia of thought, and customary schemes and approaches no longer useful today.

This activeness is determined by the level of responsibility and the ability to organize people, organize work, and ensure fulfillment of the set task. One must admit that some commanders, advocating in words the reorganization to such a style of work, themselves do not demonstrate an example of efficiency. Their activities are still dominated by an agitational and explanatory beginning, but not an organizing beginning. Officer E. Novomeyskiy, for example, talk quit a bit about the need to make combat training the primary and determining factor in the work of all officials. But one and a half months of winter training has gone by and, just as before, in his subordinate subunits there are still cases of poor quality training activities being conducted and personnel leaving without valid reasons. Experience demands that we examine such cases not only from the standpoint of fulfilling responsibilities and official duties, but also observing moral standards. A person cannot have a clear conscience if his word is not backed up by deed.

The military council and political directorate of the district attach decisive importance to ensuring the personal example of commanders, including in the area of morality and ethics, in the work for radically improving military discipline, organization, and order. Discipline, order, and a healthy moral atmosphere in a subunit start with the commander's exactingness, smartness, and pure moral make-up. Let us emphasize that these are not trifles. For example, the loss of modesty in resolving a variety of everyday problems really does not affect a commander's prestige. An analysis shows that at times the erosion of a leader's moral principles begins with "introducing" privileges for himself in precisely these spheres.

We strive to see that attention is focused on these problems at party meetings everywhere for discussing the pre-congress documents and that a situation of intolerance of any deviations from the standards of a commander's ethics is created in every officer collective. We recommend that questions of duty, honor, and ethics are brought up for discussion more often at officer meetings. One must admit that this form of work is clearly underrated in certain units. However, well-prepared and regularly held meetings can become an important lever in stepping up the activities of the officer community. Unquestionably, at these meetings it is also useful to raise questions of strengthening the sober way of life, expanding the cultural outlook, forming a family, educating children... All this has a direct bearing on the ethics of the leader, his moral make-up and, in the final analysis, the effectiveness of all his work.

I remember well the thought expressed by one of the delegates at the district party conference. Every line of the pre-congress documents, he said, is aimed at intensifying the human factor. One must agree with this. Consequently, one must also agree that leaders of all ranks, political organs, and party organizations are called upon to demonstrate constant concern for ensuring the personal example of officers, including in the sphere of morality and ethics.

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MILITARY SCIENCE

ARMY GENERAL BELOBORODOV ON TACTICAL INITIATIVE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jan 86 p 2

[Article by Arm Gen Afanasiy Pavlantiyevich Beloborodov, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union: "Combat Activeness"]

[Text] In studying tactics and mastering the skills of organization and conduct of modern combat, we officers frequently refer to the experience of the Great Patriotic War. I would like to see more frequent articles by military leaders, front line commanders and political officers on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

For example, I would read with interest the memoirs of the well-known Soviet military leader, Arm Gen A. Beloborodov and his views on combat activeness, which, as is well known, also plays a tremendous role in modern combat.

Guards Capt V. Ruzanov,  
Tank Company Commander

Fulfilling the request of our reader, the editors have offered Arm Gen Beloborodov the opportunity to discuss his views.

An important condition for achieving success in combat is combat activeness. The Military Encyclopedic Dictionary defines the term "combat activeness" as decisive actions by military personnel, subunits, units and troops as a whole, directed at seizing and holding the initiative, inflicting maximum losses upon the enemy by all existing means and successfully fulfilling the combat mission.

The importance of combat activeness has grown immeasurably under modern conditions. This is understandable. With the appearance of nuclear missile and other most modern weapons and the increased capabilities of military equipment the very nature and character of combined arms combat has changed. It is distinguished by high maneuverability and dynamism, increased spatial scope, swift tempos and a sharply changing situation.

All of this demands from today's commanders utter devotion to the cause of the party and people; thorough knowledge; the ability to wage combat operations

under any weather conditions, both day and night; boldness and decisiveness; and persistence and stubbornness in achieving victory over the enemy. The Ground Forces Military Regulation puts high combat activeness in one of the primary places among the main principles of modern combined arms combat.

The essence of this principle is constant striving to defeat the enemy. The decision to destroy the enemy must be firm and brought to final resolution without wavering. In this effort the commander must imbue his subordinates with this resolve and unfailingly accomplish the combat mission.

This is what the regulation demands. And it, as we know, contains all the tremendous experience of the past, and each line, figuratively speaking, is written in blood. Today, having moved toward all-round improvement in the effectiveness and quality of military training and intensification of the training process as a whole, we must remember the main thing -- the need to teach the troops that which is needed in war. And combat activeness is needed in war.

I recall many examples which confirm this, especially from the last year of the war, when troops of our 43d Army were in combat in the Baltic area and East Prussia. The defense of the Hitlerites there was deeply echeloned and well prepared in an engineer sense. They resisted desperately, with the ferocity of a doomed beast. They frequently counterattacked with large forces. But we almost always succeeded in dictating our will to the enemy. By decisive and active operations our units and large units did not let initiative slip from our hands.

Thus, in January 1945, during the East Prussian strategic offensive operation, army troops broke through a strong enemy defense and seized the city of Tilsit. The Hitlerites began to withdraw in order to consolidate on the next line. If this were permitted it would necessitate regrouping forces and weapons and spending much new effort in order again to punch a gap in his defense. And this in turn meant unnecessary losses and a reduction in offensive tempos.

In order not to give the Hitlerites the opportunity to come to their senses, we immediately went over to active pursuit along the entire front, without pausing. Strong forward detachments were created simultaneously in all first echelon divisions which, infiltrating through the combat formations of the enemy, destroyed his rear areas and seized crossings and road junctions. Being separated from the main forces, these forward detachments operated actively, decisively and boldly, and conducted military operations continuously, day and night, maneuvering capably. Due to this troops of the 43d Army surrounded and destroyed a major enemy grouping.

Approximately 40 km from the capital on the Volokolamsk Highway, in the vicinity of the cottage settlement of Snegira, there is a monument. Written on it are the words: "Here in the terrible days of autumn 1941 the glorious soldiers of the 16th Army stopped the enemy. From here in December 1941 they shifted to a decisive offensive and began to destroy the German Fascist invaders."

Here, on the approaches to the capital, the Far East Troops of the 78th Rifle Division, which I then commanded, had their baptism by fire, as an element of this army. In the first days of November, in what I believe was one of the most critical moments of the Battle of Moscow, we received an order from Arm Gen G. K. Zhukov, commander of the Western Front, to move one rifle regiment, reinforced with artillery, to a threatened sector west of Istra to the Ozerna River. At the time we thought that our forces were pretty small if even the front commander did not have the capability to commit a newly arrived division whole, leaving part of the division in his reserve. Now we know. The front reserves were not merely rather small, but extremely small, and it was necessary to count not only each division, but also every regiment and battalion.

After the war we spoke about this with MSU G. K. Zhukov. He stated:

"Do you remember what you had at the Ozerna behind the left flank? There was nothing. Ten kilometers of operational void. And there was nothing to cover it with. Move there our last reserve? Deprive our defense of depth? It was a dilemma!" And he added after pausing: "During the war a team would walk down nearby paths checking on things."

Our decision was in accord with that of the division commissar, regimental commissar M. Bronnikov: the first to enter battle would be the 258th Rifle Regiment, commanded by Lt Col M. Sukhanov.

During those days our army commander, Lt Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy stated to me: "Sometimes a shy poet writes courageous poems and a slovenly engineer invents the most modern mechanism... However there is a field of creativity, there is a profession, where such duality is excluded. That is our military profession. With us an iron law rules: Do as I do. In this nothing is trivial. It begins with polished buttons... Do as I do, says the commander. Be able to fire as I do. Be able to think in battle as I do. Be able to win as I do. And, finally, if your final hour comes, be able to meet it as I..."

These words could have applied completely to Sukhanov. He was a man of firm character. A heart of flint. He was distinguished by thoroughness, sober calculation and confidence in himself and his subordinates. Unhurried in his movement and taciturn, he possessed an instantaneous and very sensitive commander's reaction. We were sure that with such a commander the regiment would achieve success in its first battle. And the first combat success was very important for our division, as for any untested large unit.

Sukhanov's regiment received a very broad sector to defend, where it was impossible to create a continuous front. But the commander found the optimal solution. His plan was simple and realistic and tactically well thought out. He concentrated his main forces on the left flank, the most dangerous flank, and created a reserve in depth. He also moved his artillery to the threatened axis. He covered the remaining defensive sector with small combat security groups. The 258th Rifle Regiment, well organized and with a powerful reserve, could move in any direction, and was capable not only of defending but also of making a powerful counterattack.



Of course, there was some risk in this way of structuring our combat formations. But the risk was justified. In any case, it was much less than it would have been had we stretched out the entire battalion on line.

By increasing his efforts in a timely manner through committing reserves, executing capable counterattacks and bending the enemy to his will -- these elements of combat activeness -- Sukhanov succeeded in successfully fulfilling the combat mission -- stopping the enemy.

The principle of combat activeness is well known to today's officers. But it should be remembered that its application always demands a creative approach on the part of commanders and staffs. The wartime experience confirmed that a theoretically well trained commander is capable of applying his knowledge in practice only when he also possesses boldness, daring, persistence, stubbornness and a high feeling of responsibility for what has been entrusted to him. Without these qualities of a commander combat activeness is meaningless. Only in the aggregate will it help not only to make a good decision, but also to achieve its fulfillment.

Then, on the banks of the Ozerna, our commanders demonstrated creative thinking and made a decision which optimally met the requirements of the situation, enabled us to inflict great damage upon the enemy, stopped all his attacks, and then enabled us to shift successfully to a counteroffensive.

Without thorough knowledge of the enemy combat activeness cannot be achieved. The war quickly taught us this. Information that units of the 252d German Infantry Division were opposing us was clearly inadequate. Therefore, on the eve of the offensive we organized a raid on a broad front. Reconnaissance groups went beyond the front line.

When following an artillery preparation the 258th Rifle Regiment shifted to the attack with the mission of cutting the road along which the Hitlerites were shifting their reserves, the battalion commanded by Capt P. Borisov successfully forced the river and seized the village of Fedchino from the march. At Mikhaylovskiy, where there was a major center of enemy resistance, the Hitlerites counterattacked the battalion commanded by Capt I. Romanov. In a difficult situation, Lt Col Sukhanov, the regiment commander, demonstrated true combat activeness. He was able literally on the march to reorganize his forces. He began to increase his efforts where the Fascist defense was weakest, at the village of Fedchino. This tactical approach; i.e., redirecting the main efforts from the direction previously planned to a direction prompted by the specific combat situation, helped us to fulfill the main combat mission: to cut the Ruzskiy road and deprive the Hitlerites of the opportunity to transfer reserves along this road.

Combat activeness... We front line soldiers understood in combat its role and importance. For young officers, today's commanders, the best school of professional skill, including of forming such a quality as combat activeness, is, of course, tactical exercises. Naturally, this envisions that in them a situation is created which is responsive to the nature of modern combat and requires from the commander boldness and initiative in solving the assigned missions. Those people are acting correctly to support officers who, in the

dynamics of combat, boldly go beyond the framework of routine, avoid settled schemes and display creativity.

Tactical maturity of a commander is found precisely in rejecting routine at the necessary moment and effectively making a decision which brings success in the given, specific situation. How can one not recall the words of MSU M. N. Tukhachevskiy, who wrote: "In battle a decision made late is useful nowhere, even though it was ideal 3 hours ago..."

This law has long been noted: In battle he is active who in his daily life toils creatively, with full effort, and has a feeling for that which is new and a high responsibility for the matter entrusted to him. The efforts of commanders, supervisors and party organizations and the whole atmosphere of the life of the unit must be aimed at forming in officers readiness for combat and inculcating efficiency, initiative and a high degree of vigilance. This is the command of the time.

FROM THE EDITORS. Front line experience is our invaluable property. The feat of the Soviet soldiers who gained victory in the Great Patriotic War does not pale down through the years, and their combat experience does not lose its importance. This is why propagandizing front line experience comprised one of the main topics of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA this past year, the year of the 40th Anniversary of the great victory. This topic also has an important place in the creative plans of the editors this year, the year of the 27th CPSU Congress.

The difficult and crucial tasks stemming from the party demands about restructuring work in all areas are facing military cadres. The most important of them is to improve the quality and effectiveness of military training, the effectiveness of party political work, and to achieve a fundamental improvement of military discipline. And front line experience can become one of the levers, with the help of which these tasks will be more successfully solved.

In publishing today the article by Arm Gen A. Beloborodov, the editors request of the readers that they write with whom of the glorious Soviet military leaders, front line commanders, political workers, staff officers and specialists from rear and technical services you would like to meet on the pages of the newspaper.

We await your letters!

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CSO: 1801/0096



## ARMED FORCES

### CALIBRATION OF RADIO EQUIPMENT

Moscow TEKHNKA I VOORUZHENIYE in Russian No 2, Feb 86 pp 34-35

[Article by Lt Col V. Melnikov and Lt Col B. Zontov: "Assessing the Accuracy of Radio Equipment"]

[Text] The accuracy of radio navigational equipment of flying vehicles is qualitatively rated by the navigational parameter errors, that is, by the deviations of the results of measuring them from the true values. In order to ensure the required accuracy of equipment when monitoring radio navigational equipment parameters, engineer and technical personnel need to know the causes of the errors.

Equipment is recognized as suitable if the results of the measurements are within the limits of the prescribed tolerance zone. If a parameter value goes beyond these limits, it is set to the tolerance zone with the aid of adjustment controls. However, even when carefully performing this operation the set value, as a rule, differs from the nominal value by an amount called the initial error.

In the process of operating the radio navigational equipment, for reducing the initial error periodically, the parameters are checked with precision instruments every two or three equipment inspection and repair cycles, and their values are set in the middle of the tolerance zone. This makes it possible to reduce the initial error by 40-70 percent.

It should be noted that a sufficient measurement accuracy can also be obtained by using testing instruments having relatively large measurement errors. In this case the necessary result is achieved by making several ( $n$ ) independent measurements and determining their average values. The equipment set is considered acceptable if the average parameter value satisfies the specification requirements. In this case the standard error deviation of the parameter measurement according to the mean value decreases by a factor of  $n$ .

However, one should remember that this is valid only given independent results of all measurements. This is achieved by using different measuring devices of the same type, which makes it possible to avoid a systematic error. If the measurements are made by one instrument, then only the random error component will be decreased by a factor of  $n$ . For example, a technical maintenance unit

has two G4-1A standard-signal generators which can be used to measure the sensitivity of the receiver of the ARK-10 radio compass in the 1 subrange. Assume that the values measured by the first and second G4-1A instruments are 10 and 12 microvolts, respectively. The mean value then is 11 microvolts, which satisfies the specification requirements, according to which the receiver sensitivity must be not greater than 12 microvolts.

The procedures for checking the parameters often call for feeding stimulating signals into the input of the radio navigational equipment units and connecting different loads to the equipment. For example, dummy antennas and coupling units, measuring and testing equipment, signal sensors, and simulators are connected.

The parameter values of the connected instruments (input and output resistance, frequencies, signal levels, and so forth) in a number of cases differ from the parameter values observed under actual flight conditions. Therefore, to determine the corrections, the parameter values are measured before and after connecting its units, and the amount and sign of the correction is determined. It is found by subtracting the obtained results of these measurements. The correction is determined for each radio navigational set.

Thus, in the process of operating an aircraft responder it was noted that the resonant frequency of the transmitter during the test differed from the frequency when operating on the aircraft antenna by 0.7 MHz. Therefore, a correction was made; during the check the frequency of the transmitter was set 0.7 MHz higher so that the frequency value would be nominal when connecting the antenna. Preset and so-called high-level tuning of the oscillator (klystron) on certain airborne radars can serve as another example of making corrections to the set parameter values during a check.

During extended operation, irreversible parameter deviations sometime occur, caused by the aging processes of equipment components. In such cases it is also necessary to make the appropriate corrections during measurement and adjustment of the radio navigational equipment to decrease the error. However, before making these corrections, one must first study the tendencies of the equipment's parameter measurements over a period of time.

To do this, one can use the radio navigational parameter log books filled in during periodic technical servicing at the technical maintenance unit. By using this data, a pattern (amount and sign) can be established for the "departure" of the controlled parameters, and their values during periodic technical servicing (maintenance) can be established taking into account the deviation during the specific time interval.

Thus, in checking one of the aircraft radio responders it was determined that the sensitivity of its receiver was worsening monotonically with time. According to the technical data, the receiver sensitivity was supposed to be within the 0.6-1.0 millivolt range. Therefore, based on its tendency to worsen in time, in making the adjustments it is necessary to set the value of the sensitivity closer to the lower limit of the tolerance zone, that is, just above 0.6 millivolts.

Using the methods discussed for decreasing parameter errors makes it possible to ensure the necessary accuracy of airborne radio navigational equipment.

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## ARMED FORCES

### TRANSCAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICT MEETING IN TBILISI

[Editorial Report] Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian on 16 January 1986 carries on pages 1 and 3 a 900-word Gruzinform article entitled "To Increase Political Vigilance, To Strengthen Readiness" which reports on the 27th party conference of the Red Army Transcaucasus [Zakavkaz] Military District taking place in Tbilisi, date not given. Lieutenant General V.L. Gulevich, Defence Council member and head of the Transcaucasus Military District Political Directorate, presented a report on the new CPSU Program, changes in the Rules of the Party, tasks in further increasing combat readiness, the quality of education and strengthening military discipline. Georgian Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman and republic Gosplan Chairman Z.A. Chkheidze reported on the draft "Basic Guidelines of Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and the Period Through the Year 2000."

The article notes that speeches were given by Army General V. M. Shabanov, USSR deputy minister of defense, Colonel General K.A. Kochetov, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, and D.I. Patiashvili, first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee. Participating in the conference were D.L. Kartvelishvili, Georgian SSR Council of Ministers chairman; V.N. Konovalov, Azerbaijan CP Central Committee second secretary; Yu. P. Kochetkov, second secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee; B.V. Nikolskiy, Georgian CP Central Committee second secretary; and CP Central Committee Administrative Organs Department Head S.M. Guseynov of Azerbaijan, M.M. Davtyan of Armenia, and G.G. Gumbaridze of Georgia. Also participating were Colonel General A.I. Shirinkin, Head of the Political Directorate of the Red-Banner Transcaucasus Border District Colonel G.A. Kuts, and representatives of the Red-Banner Black Sea fleet.

"In reports and speeches of the participants, discussion emphasized that under contemporary conditions the proposal of the draft new CPSU Program that the party will strain every effort so that the USSR Armed Forces will be found at a level which will exclude the strategic superiority of imperialism is acquiring an especially important meaning. The political animation of the personal membership of the district forces, called for in decisions of the April and October (1985) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, is directed at further improving combat readiness, solving tasks in military and political preparation, and developing competition in honor of the 27th CPSU Congress." Other themes emphasized included the expedient undertaking of counterpropaganda work in connection with "the activated anti-Soviet activity of Western mass information media," the strengthening of party and labor discipline, and development of the principles of collective leadership, openness [glasnost], and establishment of a Leninist style of work in the activity of each party organization.



## NAVAL FORCES

### PREPARING COMMANDERS TO DEAL WITH 'NATO PROVOCATIONS' AT SEA

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jan 86 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Yerebin: "Who Is On the Collision Course?"]

[Text] A squadron of ships was working out a military training mission at sea. A NATO carrier strike group appeared in the same area. The commanders of the Soviet ships took all measures to observe safety. It was thought that the NATO ships would in turn do the same. However, there followed a simulated attack upon our squadron by aircraft from the aircraft carrier and fly-overs of the ship by helicopters at unacceptably close range. And one of the frigates intentionally began to maneuver dangerously.

This incident occurred a rather long time ago, at the time that the U. S. Navy and the navies of its NATO allies considered themselves to be virtually the unchallenged masters of the world's oceans. Each appearance of the Soviet Navy far from Soviet waters irritated them, and frequently caused them to initiate actions intended as deterrence. However, all attempts to frighten our navy personnel turned out to be without results. Soviet crews invariably countered the provocative actions with staunchness, restraint and professional skill.

Now the times have changed. Our navy is firmly established in the world's oceans and its might is recognized by all. Soviet naval personnel by their high standards, training, and correctness in observing international naval rules and customs have earned the high prestige and respect of the peoples of all continents. The attitude of those who love provocations toward Soviet ships has also changed. It is, obviously, a telling point that in 1972 an agreement on preventing incidents on the open sea and in the airspace above it was concluded between the Soviets and Americans.

However, there are no such agreements with other NATO countries. And it is no secret that as soon as international tension increases in one or another area of the world there is also an immediate aggravation of the situation on the seas. So that today, when one speaks about the professionalism of a ship's commander, one must consider his readiness for the most unexpected encounters on the world's oceans and his ability to foresee the nature of such encounters and capability to act in the best manner.



One must consider that one can also expect entirely unpredictable actions from other warships and other vessels flying all kinds of flags. The ship commander must always be aware that at times one meets ship handlers for whom no laws have been written. Such results of the bourgeois way of life and the chase after cash money as, let us say, the intentional sinking of ships or suicidal ships, the captains and commanders of which intentionally attempt to have an accident and seek clashes with other ships for the sake of, for example, collecting the insurance or destroying contraband goods are in no way idle inventions. Nor are meetings with naval roadhogs excluded, or simply with poorly trained and incompetent ship handlers.

An incident of this type took place recently with one of the escort ships of our task force. While on a long-range journey the ship tied up at sea at a buoy. The radiomen intersected a target which was closing and, according to practice, began to plot it. When the signalmen saw the foreign vessel it became clear that if its course were not changed a dangerous situation would arise. The commander ordered that the vessel be called upon to communicate. It did not answer. Again and again the signalmen signalled using the signalling lantern. Everything was without result. The situation was becoming more difficult with every second. Only emergency measures enabled the commander of the escort ship to avoid an accident.

It became clear later that the reason for the strange conduct of the foreign vessel was the crying carelessness of the captain and command, which virtually did not stand underway watch, but relied entirely on its automatic steering system.

Life and the practice of long-range voyages show that to sail competently and reliably oneself is not enough. It is important not only to be right if suddenly an emergency situation is created through someone else's fault. It is also important, no matter what, to safeguard the ship from damage and preserve its high combat effectiveness. And for this it is necessary, along with competence and discipline as a seafarer and punctuality in fulfilling MPPSS [expansion not found] to understand constantly and thoroughly one's responsibility for fulfilling one's tasks as a commander.

This episode is instructive in this regard. A large antisubmarine warfare ship was refueling in the Mediterranean Sea from a tanker, whose captain was N. Zalevskiy. In the distance a squadron of NATO ships was maneuvering. No one was interfering with one another. But suddenly the NATO ships abruptly changed course and began to approach the large antisubmarine warfare ship and the tanker at a high rate of speed. No reaction followed warning signals which were raised. The situation rapidly became complicated. The NATO ships maneuvered so that after a short while the Soviet ships found themselves in the center of the NATO formation. And then already claims could have been brought against our seamen.

What could they do? The tanker did not succeed in withdrawing from alongside the large antisubmarine warfare vessel. Then it was decided while they were together to accomplish an escape maneuver. The ship and the tanker simultaneously got underway, turned almost 180 degrees and quickly escaped the danger zone. The extremely difficult maneuver, never before worked out in

this way, was accomplished so synchronously and precisely that it even caused amazement on the NATO flagship. It used the semaphore to acknowledge the skill of the Soviet seamen.

Yes, seagoing skill here is of course evident. But most of all it is necessary to pay tribute to the vigilance and foresight of the ship commander and tanker captain.

Without a doubt responsibility for proper actions at sea primarily lies with the ship commanders themselves. But it is natural to ask the question: How well are they trained for this? Here one cannot rely on practical experience alone. A commander, even one who is setting out on a long voyage for the first time, must be not only thoroughly armed with deep knowledge of purely navigational characteristics and have perfected navigational skills and tactical maturity, but he must also be experienced in the changing circumstances of contemporary relations among seafarers from various countries on the world's oceans.

Staff officers are called upon to play a large role in this work. In particular they are involved in systematization of seafaring experience, working out various types of formalized diagrams, schedules and tables of calculations which facilitate decisionmaking at sea. They are acting correctly where in lessons on navigation and international law training various kinds of problem situations in seafaring are played and careful critiques are held of all kinds of situations which have occurred in world practice. Commanders demonstrate thorough interest in this kind of lessons and strive to comprehend creatively the information obtained. And behind this stands not only an increase in professional erudition, but a tangible practical outcome and confident actions by ship crews on long-range voyages.

However, we still have much to do to generalize and disseminate the most noteworthy experience of the best ship commanders. In my view it has become necessary to create in the navy a special training office, and in the future possibly also a training and methodological center on international legal training of officers, in which all the most useful information acquired by our ships during the course of lengthy voyages over many years would be concentrated.

In speaking about the long-range voyages of our ships, the fact must be taken into account that the ever increasing worldwide authority of the Soviet Navy irritates our ideological enemies. They do not cease their attempts to exploit every meeting between their ships and Soviet ships for ideological influence on the consciousness of Soviet sailors.

However, the fact remains that ordinary sailors, especially of civilian vessels, as a rule look at us with curiosity and sympathy as citizens of the world's first Socialist state, and value highly our good will and readiness at any moment to render selfless assistance to those who suffer misfortune. Trying here as well to find a crack to push through their ideology, commanders of NATO ships have begun to emphasize actively at every convenient instance the naval brotherhood which supposedly stands outside of politics.

But our sailors understand well what is concealed behind this. And they not only understand it, but through all of their service, courage, staunchness and skill in accomplishing their missions they affirm the superiority of Communist ideology and the Soviet way of life. This is manifested on the sea, where Soviet crews are usually located for many months and retain high moral spirit. It is manifested at calls to foreign ports, where their discipline, standard of conduct and good will sharply distinguish them from the sailors of NATO countries.

It is noteworthy that on long-range voyages the interest of the personnel of our ships in expanding their political self-education increases. Propaganda and counterpropaganda literature enjoys widespread demand among our sailors. They are particularly active in political classes and measures devoted to revealing the aggressive essence of imperialism, its antipopular thrust and constant striving toward militarization. And what is especially important, they confirm all of this in practice, giving a swift, convincing and thorough rebuff in the event of possible ideological assaults upon them.

I recall an instructive example. At one of the Mediterranean ports a West German ship docked next to our cruiser. As a provocation someone from its command painted a swastika on a pipe. Such a prank could not be left without reaction. That evening on the quarterdeck of the cruiser which, naturally, was visible from the wharf and other ships, the film, "The Kursk Bulge" began to be shown. Our sailors watched it with particular interest. Yes, and the sequences of burning Tiger Tanks created an impression on our neighbors. The captain of the West German vessel immediately put out to sea.

Soviet seamen are called representatives of their homeland because when they set out on long-range voyages they not only accomplish military training missions, but also represent our country on the expanses of the world's oceans. This is a great honor and a high trust. Skill, courage and high ideological tempering -- the inherent qualities of the Soviet sailor -- help to justify them.

9069

CSO: 1801/96

NAVAL FORCES

REVIEW: FLT ADM YEGOROV MEMOIRS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jan 86 p 2

[Review by Flt Adm V. Kasatonov, Hero of Soviet Union, of book "Farvaterami flotskoy sluzhby" [The Channels of Naval Service], by Flt Adm Yegorov, Voenizdat, 1985, 240 pages, price 1 ruble 30 kopecks]

[Text] Our military memoir literature has been enriched by a new publication about the terrible days of the Great Patriotic War. Voenizdat [Military Publishing House] has published the book by Fleet Admiral G. Yegorov, "Farvaterami flotskoy sluzhby" [The Channels of Naval Service]. On the basis of personal recollections, stories of comrades, and archive data the author shows convincingly the unfading exploit of the submarine seamen of the twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the first years of the Great Patriotic War when he was a navigator, executive officer of a submarine, and captain of a ship. He tells with sincere warmth about his comrades in service on the submarine "Shch-310" and first of all, about its commander, D. Yaroshevich, a person with a firm worker's grip and, at the same time, one who possesses a deep internal style. Over the years and distances, G. Yegorov carried in his heart and memory the words of his commander with which the latter turned to the crew of the submarine on assuming his post:

"The most dangerous man on the submarine is the one who does nothing and who has no ability. I call upon everyone: improve yourself and improve yourself in your work. Study the ship and your specialty." Profound knowledge of their work multiplied by high skill helped the crew of "Shch-310" to accomplish combat missions and avoid destruction.

It is with a sense of pride that G. Yegorov recalls the unparalleled courage of the city of Leningrad's working class. Under blockade conditions, in the winter of 1941-1942 alone the workers, engineers, and technicians of the Leningrad shipyards repaired and prepared 36 submarines for combat operations.

Much space in the book is devoted to the activity of submariner navigators. And this is completely proper since the author was a navigator for a long time. He shows this difficult, important service using many examples, distinguishing what is new and special and what can be adopted even now. The thought of the sources of courage and of the effectiveness of the indoctrinational work of commanders and political officers and the communists' personal example in battle runs through the pages of the book.



Passage through a minefield was a difficult test for the submariners. Metal scrapes along the side. The boat touched a cable holding a mine. This time all turned out well. And our commissar, Aleksandr Ivanovich Bakanov, the author recalls, could distract a person from sad thoughts with a joke, apt word, or advice. In various life's situations the political officer must be a teacher, and psychologist, and political figure, and philosopher. And besides, he must master words expertly without fail. And although the boat was divided into compartments and waterproof steel bulkheads separated people from one another the crew was a single, serried collective thanks to Bakanov to a great extent.

Today ships of the Soviet Navy are sailing far and for months. Far from the shores, when the seamen are left face to face with the ocean, simple human qualities at times acquire decisive significance for the commander's authority and become visible since their influence on the collective and its attitude increases sharply in this situation.

The author has interesting reflections on the honor and decency of a person, especially of officers in whom these qualities should be, as they say, ingrained. "It is recalled," he writes, "how previously there was the expression: 'I give you the word of an officer.' Now you rarely hear it. And what a pity. This expression testified to the authority of an officer's word, to the fact that this word is firm and that the person who gave it will keep his promise at any cost."

The book of reminiscences of Hero of the Soviet Union and member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Fleet Admiral G. Yegorov, is also interesting in that the author, with knowledge of the matter and seemingly leafing through the pages of his life, analyzes the various aspects of a fleet commander's activity and, in particular, the work of the staff, showing how the whole picture of the life and activity of the subunits, large units, and formations is formed in this leading organ. Using strokes of recollections, the author seems to lead the reader into the circle of many problems and shows the organizing role of the staffs which permit accomplishing difficult and important tasks competently and efficiently.

In his memoirs, the author tells of his first acquaintance with nuclear-powered vessels and about meetings with officers, petty officers, and seamen on them. It is with interest that one reads the pages about the famous nuclear submarine "Leninskiy Komsomol" which, travelling a considerable distance beneath the permanent pack ice, reached the North Pole for the first time in the history of the Soviet fleet. This voyage to the pole required thorough preparation of both the crew and equipment since it was fraught with much that was new and unknown.

In the concluding chapters, the author tells about the potentialities of the Soviet fleet and about the great achievements of Soviet shipbuilding, the mastery of atomic energy, and the most important voyage of nuclear submarines which travelled more than 20,000 miles without surfacing through little-studied regions which at times were not even equipped for navigation.

The book by G. Yegorov will help to instill in military seamen a responsibility for the security of our motherland, a rise in their communist conviction, high political and class vigilance, and constant readiness for an exploit.



## SPECIAL TROOPS

### SOCIALIST COMPETITION CHALLENGE: MILITARY TRADE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jan 86 p 1

[Unsigned article: "Work Effectively and at a High Level of Quality"]

[Text] Enroute to the 27th CPSU Congress, workers of the leading military trading organization of the Carpathian Military District Trade Administration, led by N. Golot, met the 1985 plan targets ahead of time, as well as the overall targets of the 11th Five-Year Plan.

The collective of this military trading organization, having made its Socialist commitments for 1986, appealed to all workers in military trade to develop Socialist competition for unconditional fulfillment of plan targets, a careful attitude toward material trade valuables and zealous management under the slogan, "Work Effectively and at a High Level of Quality and Ensure a High Standard of Commercial and Personal Services!"

Appeal By The Collective Of The Military Trading Organization  
From The Carpathian Military District Trade Administration  
To All Workers In Military Trade

Dear Comrades!

Preparing to greet worthily the 27th CPSU Congress, the collective of our military trading organization is filled with resolve to achieve unconditionally fulfillment of 1986 plan targets.

Carefully analyzing the past year's results and weighing their capabilities and reserves, military trading organization workers took on for 1986 -- the first year of the 12th Five-Year Plan -- the following Socialist commitments:

To fulfill the plan for retail trade exchange by 25 December and sell goods valued at 350,000 rubles above the plan, with no less than 90 percent of the increase in trade exchange obtained through improved labor productivity.

To improve commercial work. To strengthen and expand direct ties with suppliers. To not permit low quality goods into the trading network.



workers, overcoming incredible difficulties of the fall and severe winter of 1941 and steadfastly enduring the deprivations of conditions of the evacuation, accomplished in record times the rebasing and reconstruction of plants at the new sites. Suffice it to say that after only a few months in unadapted and unheated buildings, and sometimes simply under the open skies, many of the enterprises began producing goods needed by the front.

The book also shows how, in addition to the rapid increase in production of arms and ammunition, there was intense work in design bureaus and laboratories, at plants and institutes, and at test ranges for developing more improved combat equipment.

For example, about 40 percent of the artillery systems in service in the Red Army were designed and put into production in the course of the war. I think the reader will read with interest the chapters which talk about the development of the famous "thirty-fours", KV and IS tanks, and mortars. One of the book's chapters is devoted to rocket artillery, the famous "katyusha" Guards rocket launchers. It is known that the appearance of mobile salvo-fire rocket launchers in the Red Army, capable of plastering the enemy with tens and hundreds of tons of lethal fire in a matter of seconds, was a complete surprise to the enemy. The book shows how the Guards mortars were created, tells about their creators and the work of the enterprises forging the formidable weapon, and how this weapon was used by the Guards in battles.

I would also like to note that, for the first time in domestic literature, this book tells about the organization of the Soviet ammunition industry and its development during the Great Patriotic War. Figuratively speaking, ammunition is the bread of war. And it was required in enormous amounts. Suffice it to say that a large part of the metal during the war went to making ammunition.

The authors show how various types of ammunition were developed and how difficulties, which were experienced by this sector of industry dangerously explosive in its technology, were overcome in supplying the Red Army. Workers of the ammunition industry fulfilled their duty with honor; during the war years they provided more than 10 million tons of ammunition for the front.

The reader will find much new, interesting, and instructive information in the chapters devoted to the development and production of tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, optical instruments, and aviation artillery and gunnery armament. It appears that each section of the work could become the subject of a separate study.

One of the book's merits is that it also gives the names of leaders of people's commissariats, main administrations, enterprises, scientific research institutes, and design bureaus, scientists, designers, manufacturing engineers, workers, and commanders of production who participated directly in developing models of weapons and ammunition and organizing their mass production and who made a significant personal labor contribution to achieving victory. Photographs of many of them are featured.

The book is written in language that is easy to understand, richly illustrated, and well published. There is no doubt that it will be read with interest by soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces and workers of the industry. It will serve as a good aid in military patriotic education of our young people.

12567

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11 April 1986

DOSAAF

## ORLENOK: JOINT METHODOLOGY CONFERENCE

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 12 Jan 86 p 1

[Article by I. Senetskaya: "Orlenok: Successes and Reserves"]

[Text] A joint session of the methodological council of the initial military training office, Central Institute For Teacher Improvement (TsIUU), RSFSR Ministry of Education, and the main headquarters of Orlenok was held in Moscow. At this meeting problems were discussed concerning further improving the komsomol military-sports game -- a mandatory and basic form of out-of-class military-patriotic work in the secondary schools, vocational-technical schools and technical schools.

M. Prudkov, TsIUU methodologist and member of the Orlenok main headquarters, made a report on the role of the komsomol game in further improving initial military training of school children. Having noted that Orlenok is becoming more and more popular, he stressed shortcomings and unsolved problems. The speaker emphasized the need to improve the interaction of all founders of the game; increase the role of sponsoring military units in creating the base for initial military training; and strengthen their assistance to schools, vocational-technical schools and technical schools.

It is important to increase in every way the mass nature of the young army movement. In many training institutions Orlenok has not yet become a main form of out-of-class mass defense work and of physical and initial military training of the students. Frequently adults excessively supervise the participating young people, which fetters their initiative.

A. Mamayev, chief of the administration for mass organizational work and military-patriotic propaganda, USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, discussed the role of DOSAAF committees and primary and educational organizations in developing the young army movement and popularizing the Orlenok game. He also discussed the assistance which DOSAAF is giving to the young army battalions in developing the sport of shooting and in familiarizing the Orlenok participants with other sports having technical and military applications.

The USSR DOSAAF publishing house has published many books and placards for the purpose of propagandizing the military-sports game. DOSAAF enterprises are making an important contribution to strengthening the initial military

training base, which is used for training the young army members. The speaker called upon those attending the meeting to use more widely the training and material base of DOSAAF schools and clubs for organizing work with the Orlenok participants.

Z. Sabitov, military instructor at the 1st Ulyanovskiy Secondary School imeni V. I. Lenin; Yu. Metsenatov, military instructor at the Cheboksary SPTU-4 [rural vocational-technical school-4]; Z. Gryaznova, chief of the Tushinskiy RONO [rayon department of education] in Moscow; A. Morozova, director of the 644th Moscow Secondary School; T. Fedotova, secretary of the Taganrog City Committee, VLKSM, and others shared their experience in the work of organizing the komsomol military-sports game.

L. Pesterev, chief of the main headquarters of the Orlenok game summarized the results of the meeting. He noted that Orlenok had become an effective form of work in the ideological-political and moral indoctrination of young people. It has an increasing role in solving those tasks with which the party has today charged the Soviet school.

But there are still many shortcomings in the organization of the game. The majority of them are associated with underestimating the role of the komsomol game in the civic upbringing of our younger generation and in preparing youths for service in the Armed Forces.

It is very important, he emphasized, to develop in every way self management of the young army. More trust must be shown toward the young people and they must be helped to become capable commanders. The game should take place throughout the year. During the summer period it must be cultivated in defense-sports camps and labor and rest camps.

The Orlenok main headquarters gave awards at the session to a large group of komsomol military-sports game activists.

9069

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## MILITARY HISTORY

### REVIEW: MEMOIRS OF KONKOV

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jan 86 p 2

[Review by retired Col N. Sedykh, entitled: "In the Fire of Battles" of book by V. Konkov: "A Time Near and Far Away," Voenizdat, 1985, 208 pp.]

[Text] The combat journey of Maj Gen V. Konkov, author of these memoirs, began in the revolutionary events of 1917 and in the clashes against Tsarist autocracy, which is recounted in the chapter, "Under the October Banner." A village lad from Ryazan, he knew from childhood, as they say, "the price of a pound of evil." He attended his first universities in a kulak field, where he learned the essence of class hatred and the class struggle. Then, due to famine the boy left for Moscow, where he settled in the proletarian Simonovka settlement, found good people there and became strong friends with them, and where Petr Ivanovich Klimov, a Bolshevik from the boiler factory became his mentor for many years.

The book tells about the events of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Moscow, the battle against counterrevolution and the power of the Soviets. Behind the lines of the narrative one seems to hear the rustling of the crimson banners on the manifestos of the laboring people, the invocatory slogans of the Bolsheviks, and the booming "Ura!" of the Red Guards of Simonovka, within the ranks of which was Vasilii Konkov, as they attacked the Krutitskiy barracks, where the warrant officer school and gunpowder depots were located, and then along with the revolutionary soldiers stormed the Kremlin, where the cadets had ensconced themselves.

The revolution summoned the young worker-Red Guardsman Vasilii Konkov into the ranks of the Red Army, and from 1920 on he becomes a "state man." In the chapters, "I Put On the Red Army Greatcoat," and "In the Years Before the Terror," the author tells the reader how he and his comrades, young Red Army personnel, passed the school of courage and military skill.

In the years before the great military threat the author commanded a rifle regiment and division. It was a time of intense military and political training and of polishing military skill. And everything which was done on the parade field, training classes and in tactical exercises in the field soon proved useful. The division was transferred to the Karelian Isthmus and took most active part in battles against the White Finns in the war of 1939-1940.

In May 1940 units of the 115th Division, commanded by V. Konkov, went to summer camp and there, taking into account the experience of past battles, worked out a procedure for coordination with tanks, artillerymen and combat engineers. All this came in handy when the 115th had to fight feverishly against the German Fascist invaders. In the chapter, "The War Begins," the author discusses the first border clashes against the enemy, the courage of the Soviet soldiers and their loyalty to their duty.

By autumn 1941 a serious situation had taken shape on the Neva. The enemy threw mobile units of the 39th Motorized Corps toward Lake Ladoga, in order to close the blockade around Leningrad. Units of the 115th are transferred to the area of Nevskaya Dubrovka. The chapter, "The Legendary Neva Spit" tells about how the operation to break the Leningrad blockade was prepared and carried out. At the time the author joined the command of the Neva operational group. He tells about the heroes of the battles for the "spit of land" touchingly, with love and warmth.

Soon the situation forced Maj Gen Konkov to become "requalified." He was designated chief of the rear of the 30th Army and then deputy commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army for the rear. There were new battles and new heroes. They are discussed in the following chapters of the book. In summarizing his memoirs the author writes: "We did not bear the proud title of Guardsmen in vain. We knew how to and were able to defeat a perfidious enemy in battle. We covered each other staunchly when deadly danger threatened. We honorably and directly, in a party manner, spoke to a comrade to his face if he committed a mistake. It was a great unity of hearts and aspirations. It helped us to withstand the hard times and gain victory.

I believe that our memoirs about the past war have been supplemented by yet another needed book. The narrative, "A Time Near and Far Away," is written in good, descriptive language. Readers, especially young people, will read this book with interest. It again recalls how difficult it was for the working people to make the revolution and how hard it was to achieve victory in battles against those who tried to infringe upon the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution. It reminds us and forces us to think about our duty to continue the race of the older generations.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

U.S. SPECIAL FORCES SEEN AS INSTRUMENT OF TERROR

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 85 pp 26-27

[Article by Col (Res) N. Nikitin: "Terrorists in Berets"; from materials in the foreign press]

[Text] ...It is the dead of night. Rain. A sentinel in the uniform of a Soviet soldier is moving slowly along a barbed wire enclosure. A shadow suddenly appears behind him. The sentinel rattles in his throat and drops slowly to the ground: his neck has been strangled to death by a steel cord which was skillfully thrown over him by the attacker. Armed figures in the uniform of servicemen of the U.S. Army's Special Forces appear. They penetrate to the area being guarded and lay explosives in vulnerable places of an important industrial object. Then the "Green Berets" dissolve in the darkness. Only the small light of the Bickford fuse burns treacherously.

But no explosion followed. It is a regular drill which was conducted by "students" of the Special Forces Training Center located at Fort Bragg. "Here, in pine forests near Fort Bragg," wrote the American weekly UNITED STATES NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, "volunteer soldiers learn to penetrate onto communist territory, arm and train groups of the local population, and then help these groups of insurgents to attack transport columns and destroy communications."

There are many such centers for training saboteurs and terrorists in the West. Just what missions are the soldiers of the subunits and units of the U.S. Army's Special Forces called upon to accomplish?

The only difference between the mercenaries is the color of the berets, but they all have the same goal--to organize terror and sabotage, conduct reconnaissance, suppress the national-liberation movement, and so forth.

The ardent anticommunist, James Burnham, supplied the theoretical basis for such operations in the United States at the beginning of the 1950's. The victory of the United States and its allies in a war against the USSR and other socialist countries, Burnham prophesied, is possible only as a result of simultaneous strikes internally and from without. To create forces for the "second front," Pentagon strategists also began to form the U.S. Army Special Forces which are also called "Green Berets" or "Rangers."

According to Washington's scheme, in case of combat operations these troops are to unleash "a new kind of war" in the socialist countries. It will be "a war of subversive elements, rebels, and murderers, a war from ambush, a war by means of infiltration and not of attack."

"The special methods of war, including psychological and sabotage aspects," wrote the Americal General (Trokell) in this connection in the journal INFORMATION DIGEST, "were regenerated from former random tactical support of local operations to strategic activity having important significance for commanders who are fighting in the main theater of military operations. These methods expanded the battlefield to the very heart of the enemy's country."

In the Pentagon's plans, the "Green Berets" are considered not only as terrorists and saboteurs who are operating in the interests of the military command, but also as organizers of "guerilla" warfare by forces of local traitors. According to the arithmetic of the Pentagon generals, each independent subunit numbering about 14 "Rangers" is to organize and train a detachment numbering 1,000-1,500 local saboteurs and to lead them on the territory of the hostile state. In this way, the Washington administration counts on creating its "fifth column" numbering hundreds of thousands of people in the socialist countries.

The U.S. Special Forces accomplished their first crimes abroad at the beginning of the 1950's, suppressing the partisan movement in the rear area of American troops in South Korea and accomplishing sabotage actions on the territory of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

The "new era" for the espionage-terrorist formations set in with the coming to power of the Kennedy administration, called with full justification the "holy father" of Special Forces by the American press. During it, in 1962 the size of the "Special Forces" increased eight fold.

At the same time, for the rapid manning of the bandit formations the U.S. Congress passed a special law which permitted the recruitment of foreigners and, first of all, turncoats from the socialist countries, for the Special Forces of the American Army. As the newspaper NEW YORK TIMES noted in those days, they are needed "for the overthrow of communist regimes without general war and even without local wars." As evidenced by the American newspaper ARMY TIMES, some small units of the Special Forces consist completely of foreigners who undergo training in their native language. There are "Polish," "Hungarian," "Czech," "Russian," "Ukrainian," and other detachments.

Now troops of the special forces are part of all the services of the U.S. Armed Forces--the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Their overall direction is accomplished by the Pentagon through the Special Warfare Directorate and branches which have been created with the headquarters of American troops in Europe and in the western part of the Pacific Ocean as well as with the headquarters of the NATO armed forces commander. In the army structure, the "Green Berets" together with the psychological warfare organizations form a special sabotage-subversion service which is actually an adjunct of the CIA.

In the publication of the London Institute of Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance for 1981/1985," it is pointed out that seven Special Forces groups have been formed in the U.S. Army with a total strength of about 10,000 men. They

are based in the continental part of the country in readiness for operations in specific regions of the world. Thus, one is intended for sabotage in Asia and the region of the Pacific Ocean, another is aimed at African states, a third at the Near and Middle East, and so forth. The terrorists wear the traditional green beret with a cap badge in the form of crossed arrows and a knife set off by the demagogic inscription, "De Oppresso Liber." On the left sleeve they have a light blue patch where an orange knife crossed by three bolts of lightning is embroidered and which symbolize the readiness of the Special Forces to operate on land, on water, and in the air.

A Special Forces group is a separate reconnaissance and sabotage unit of the American Ground Forces. It consists of a headquarters, headquarters company, three battalions, and signal and service companies (a total of more than 1,200 men).

A battalion (about 250 men) includes a headquarters, headquarters company, and three companies of "Green Berets" (in each one a headquarters section and five detachments of 14 men each).

The detachment is considered the basic subunit of the Special Forces troops. It includes two officers (commander and deputy) and 12 specialists in combat operations, reconnaissance, mining and demolitions, radio communications, material and technical support, and medical service. In case of necessity, the detachment can be divided into two smaller subunits of seven men each.

For the conduct of reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the enemy rear area, up to 50 detachments can be created from a group each numbering 14 men or about 100 of 7 men each. They are dropped to a depth of 350-3,000 kilometers.

Two separate battalions of "Rangers" with 600 saboteurs in each have also been formed in the U.S. Army. They wear black berets and have on their sleeves a patch with the inscription "Ranger." The battalions are intended for the accomplishment of reconnaissance and sabotage missions in the enemy's rear area in the interests of an army corps. The battalion includes a headquarters, headquarters company, and three companies of "Rangers" which include a headquarters section, three infantry platoons, and a weapons platoon.

Up to 70 detachments of "Rangers" can be dropped in the enemy rear area to a depth of 75-450 kilometers. In individual cases, they operate as assault and assault landing groups.

Along with units and small units of Special Forces, deep reconnaissance companies have been formed in the army corps of the United States consisting of the following: a headquarters section, signal platoon, and three deep reconnaissance platoons (in each one seven detachments of five men each--a commander, deputy, scout-specialist, and two radio operators). Altogether, the company can allot 24 detachments. For operations in the tactical depth of the enemy defense it is contemplated that reconnaissance-sabotage groups of the mechanized (infantry) brigades will be used. The training of the groups is conducted under the direction of "Ranger" instructors who have undergone training in a special school at Fort Benning, Georgia.

The contemporary soldier-saboteur from infantry subunits of the U.S. Army is, so to say, a hybrid of the "Green Beret" and a regular infantryman. He is not yet ranked among the "elite" of the secret war but most often it will be just such groups which will be dropped in the forward rear area of enemy troops.

Air Force Special Forces have been created in the United States to support operations of saboteurs on foreign territory (transportation, supply, evacuation, and protection in combat) and their participation in counter-guerilla measures. They are aviation units which are equipped with reconnaissance airplanes, attack aircraft, transport aircraft, and helicopters. For example, during the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, as the foreign press reported, these forces included approximately 30 squadrons (more than 700 airplanes and helicopters). They now number three squadrons in the regular Air Force and eight in the reserve.

As a rule, terrorists and saboteurs operate in accordance with a scheme which has been worked out: emergence (drop) in the enemy rear area, movement to the assigned area, conduct of reconnaissance, knocking out planned objectives, transmission of information to the center, and march (lift) to a new area. When accomplishing combat and special missions, it is recommended to them that they employ sabotage, raids, and ambushes, organize sabotage, form "insurgent" bandit detachments, and conduct a counter-guerilla struggle and subversive propaganda. In the views of the American command all means are good for the attainment of the goal.

One of the important tasks of the "Green Berets" is ideological sabotage against the enemy's armed forces and population. "From the rear," the Pentagon bosses teach, "our 'guerillas'--the Special Forces' troops--will undermine the enemy's morale, and at the front the minds of the enemy soldiers will be actively influenced by the troop subversive propaganda apparatus--psychological warfare organs and subunits in the theater of military operations.

In conducting a policy of global terror, the ruling circles of the United States are sparing no means to equip the Special Forces with everything necessary. In the arsenal of the "Green Berets" are noiseless pistols, sniper rifles, the latest submachineguns and machineguns, recoilless guns and mortars, portable mines, and ampoules with poisons, combat toxic agents, or death-dealing bacteria. According to reports in the American press the ("Summa") small nuclear device or sabotage bomb, which possesses a yield of 1-3 kilotons, can be carried freely by one man. A sabotage grenade has been created which is the size of a croquet ball and with a TNT equivalent of 10 tons.

Magnetic, acoustical, chemical, thermal, and other sabotage mines are constantly being improved on orders from the Pentagon. Barbarous booby traps concealed as inoffensive objects--fountain pens, watches, candy, children's toys, and so forth--are under development and being manufactured.

The "Rangers" tested many of the latest means of terror and destruction on the long-suffering Vietnamese land. The killing of peaceful residents was a common matter for the bandits from across the ocean. The Pentagon paid them a special bonus--500 piasters--for each "enemy who was rendered harmless." During the conduct of the "Phoenix" anti-guerilla operation, as the American newspapers wrote, in 1969 the "Green Berets" destroyed 18,000 Vietnamese peasants who were suspected of sympathizing with the National Liberation Front of Vietnam.



Troops of the Special Forces regularly participate in numerous exercises conducted by the Pentagon. They are constantly involved in various punitive actions. For example, they tried to liberate the American hostages in Iran in April 1980 and committed outrages in a bloody raid in Laos at the beginning of 1981. Today the "Green Berets" are killing peaceful residents of Nicaragua, Salvador, and other sovereign states. "The United States," as the weekly UNITED STATES NEWS AND WORLD REPORT cynically confides, "is already conducting a new type of underground war, using 25,000 specially trained Americans and expending two billion dollars a year on it. This select army is engaged in a struggle with insurgents in 50 countries of the world."

At the April (1985) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee it was noted: "It is not necessary to possess special political vision to see that in recent years imperialism has intensified subversive work and is coordinating its actions against the socialist states. This is being spread to the spheres--political, ideological, and military." The activity of the imperialist intelligence services and special military formations requires Soviet servicemen constantly to raise their vigilance and tirelessly improve combat readiness.

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## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### DISCUSSION OF ANNUAL SPEECH BY NORWAY'S DEFENSE MINISTER

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jan 86 p 3

[Article by Col A. Chekulayev: "The Strange Logic of Mr. Sjaastad"]

[Text] As has already been reported, Norway's minister of defense Anders Sjaastad presented his traditional annual report on the country's security policy at the Oslo Military Society. And, judging by press commentaries, this time he did not give diplomatic courtesies, but called directly for a further increase in the NATO military presence in the north of Europe. Not wishing, apparently, to repeat word for word that which had already been stated repeatedly by the Atlanticists, Mr. Sjaastad introduced local coloring, so to speak, into his report. He obviously believed that this had to have a psychological impact on Norwegians. The minister of defense told the representatives of the military society who had gathered in Oslo not only about some "increase in the USSR military capability" in the region, but also about the supposedly looming "threat that the Soviet Union would seize Norway in the event a conflict arises."

Probably no attention should be paid to these insinuations by the Norwegian minister. They are not distinguished by particular originality and have much in common with the views of other NATO leaders. However, cloaked in these insinuations, Sjaastad tried to justify the government's open departure from its previous pledge not to deploy foreign troops and nuclear weapons on its territory. Thus in Trondelag district a depot for heavy weapons and equipment has been built for the American Marine Corps brigade which is to move to Norway under conditions of a "crisis situation." The newspaper FORSVARETS FORUM writes that 20 miles to the north of the Bardufoss military airbase it is planned to begin work to create stores of heavy weapons for Canadian, British and Dutch contingents of NATO reinforcement forces.

Facts indicating that it is planned to deploy American aircraft carrier task forces off the Norwegian shores, intended to make nuclear strikes against vitally important centers of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, have also become known to society. In particular, U. S. Adm MacDonald, commander in chief of Combined NATO Armed Forces in the Atlantic, spoke about this. According to him the objective of deploying these task forces in the north of Europe is "more effective implementation of the policy of an

offensive from forward lines, which requires the presence of American naval forces in the Norwegian Sea."

Mastery of Norwegian territory by NATO forces is also provided for on a regular basis. It takes place during numerous maneuvers and exercises and while developing planned military training of individual NATO units and subunits. It is noteworthy that on the day of Sjaastad's speech the Norwegian Telegraph Bureau reported that in March of this year large-scale NATO maneuvers would be conducted in the northern part of the country under the code name, "Anchor Express-86."

However, this increase in military preparations does not trouble Mr. Sjaastad at all. According to his logic, these measures "strengthen the basis for the further preservation of a low tension profile for Norway in the north." In reality, the actions justified by the Norwegian minister of defense to activize militaristic NATO activity in the north of Europe threaten the security of the peoples of the countries located there and lead to increased tension in the region.

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## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### WESTERN MORTAR-LAUNCHED ANTITANK WEAPONS REVIEWED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Dec 85 p 3

[Article by Col (Ret) N. Grishin, candidate of technical sciences, under rubric "Military-Technical Review: From a Mortar Against a Tank"]

[Text] In the assessment of foreign military specialists, one of the principal missions in conducting combat actions under present-day conditions will be the destruction of enemy tanks and other armored vehicles. It is planned to use the most varied means to combat them, from tactical missiles with nuclear warheads to antitank hand grenades and rifle grenades but, as the foreign press notes, the mortar is called upon to play a role of no small importance in this vast arsenal.

This decision may seem unexpected, but foreign specialists motivate it by the "revision of views on mortars" which began in the West in the late 1970's and early 1980's. The significant strengthening of frontal and side armor of modern tanks and reduction in their silhouette, which hampers destruction of the combat vehicles by traditional means, was one of the reasons for this revision. Mortar ammunition with a high flight trajectory could hit a tank from above, where it has the weakest armor, and the tank's overhead projection area (looking down from above) is 2-3 times larger than the side projection.

Here is one more argument of the foreign experts: the maximum range of fire of modern 81-120 mm mortars even with conventional (not rocket-assisted) rounds is 5-7 km, i.e., it exceeds the range both of foreign antitank guided missile systems and of antitank guns.

This is why the idea of using mortars to knock out tanks and other armored equipment by mortar fire from indirect firing positions even before the aforementioned classic direct-fire antitank weapons will be able to join battle seems so attractive to foreign specialists.

The press reports that by virtue of these reasons a number of western countries are using the latest electronic achievements to perform active work to create [sozdaniye] for mortars antitank rounds capable of detecting moving armored targets and homing on them on the terminal leg of the flight trajectory.




Beginning in 1978 West German firms in cooperation with the American company of Martin Marietta have been designing the Bussard 120-mm guided mortar round. According to reports by the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, the first phase of test firings of the mortar round with a semiactive laser homing head and hollow charge warhead was completed in 1983 at the West German Meppen proving ground. During the tests three rounds weighing 17 kg and more than one meter long were fired from a conventional 120-mm mortar against a laser-illuminated M48 tank. Direct hits on the target were noted in all three instances.

Foreign specialists note that the results of test firings revealed serious deficiencies in the Bussard round. They include the need to illuminate the target with a laser from a forward observation post, helicopter, or drone. It is now planned to create Bussard variants with infrared and radar homing heads not requiring target illumination. It is assumed that such mortar rounds can be used according to the "fire and forget" principle.

The journal ARTILLERI-TIDSKRIFT reports that Swedish firms of FFV and Saab have been creating [sozdavat] a guided 120-mm mortar round since 1980. It is presumed that the round's combat weight will be 16 kg, it will be 83 cm long and will have a range of fire of from 600 to 8,000 meters. The nose of the round, named the Strix, contains an infrared homing head. The hollow charge warhead is 35 cm long and weighs 1.2 kg (of which explosives account for 0.9 kg).

A solid-propellant booster and sustainer motor are installed in the tail unit of the Strix in place of a conventional powder propellant charge. The booster motor separates after firing 20 m from the mortar. The round accelerates to a maximum velocity of 320 m/sec.

In-flight stabilization is provided by an opening tail fin assembly with a 30 cm span. Two rows of miniature solid-propellant rocket impulse motors (see figure) located around the circumference of the round's midsection are used to guide the round to the target according to commands from the onboard gear on the terminal leg of the flight trajectory.



According to reports by INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, an improved target discriminator is being developed [razrabatyvat] for the Strix which will keep the round from homing on tanks already destroyed.

The United States is working on guided rounds for the most widespread mortar, the 106.7-mm M30. According to tactical-technical specifications given the developers, the round must weigh no more than 18 kg, have a length of around 80 cm, a minimum range of fire within 100-750 m and a maximum range of 6-8 km. Several variants of such a round are being created, differing chiefly in the type and design of sensors used in the homing head--infrared and radar (the operating frequency is 35 and 94 GHz).

A mockup of one such round (lower right photo [photo not reproduced]) was demonstrated at the latest U.S. Army weapons exhibit in Washington. It weighs 13.1 kg and is 84.5 cm long. A homing head is installed in the case which is supposed to detect targets from a height of 1,000-2,000 m over an area of some 20 hectares. The case also contains the guidance system unit with a digital microprocessor, gas generator and jet control nozzles.

Martin Marietta plans to use millimeter band radar sensors in the guided round. The American command's attempt to improve capabilities of light divisions being established in the United States for combating armored targets served as new impetus for accelerating work on guided rounds.

Great Britain also is developing new mortar rounds. A guided antitank mine called Merlin is being created for the 81-mm mortar found in British Army subunits and the armies of other countries in large numbers (several tens of thousands). The Merlin round is to weigh 6 kg, be 90 cm long, and have a hollow charge warhead and active radar homing head operating in the millimeter waveband.

It is assumed that the homing head will be able to detect armored targets over an area of 300x300 m on terrain within range of fire. The Merlin will have a logic unit for discriminating moving targets from stationary (already hit) targets. A six-fin tail unit and four control surfaces located on the forward part of the case (canard aerodynamic configuration) open when the round reaches the vertex of its flight trajectory. The hollow charge warhead is contained in the tail section and this, in the estimate of British designers, will allow achieving maximum armor penetration.

Foreign specialists include the small field of view (around 9 hectares) of the round's homing head among its deficiencies. This will require inclusion of forward observers in teams to report target coordinates with consideration of target speed and direction of movement.

As JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY recently reported, France also is creating a guided mortar round with a radar homing head (with a 10 hectare field of view). It has a caliber of 120 mm and a range of fire of up to 10 km. In contrast to the Merlin, jet nozzles and not aerodynamic control surfaces are used for guidance to the target. The warhead of the French round is not in the tail section, but in the midsection of the case and is connected with the nose section by a channel for passage of the hollow-charge jet.

Foreign military specialists believe that guided mortar rounds which will be capable of firing against tanks and other combat vehicles from mortars in the inventory (81-mm and larger caliber) will begin to come into the inventory of ground forces of a number of western countries as early as the late 1980's and early 1990's.

## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### DEPLOYMENT OF B-1B NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jan 86 p 3

[Editorial under the rubric "In the Arsenals and at the Test Ranges": "New Strategic Bomber"]

[Text] As reported by the magazine DEFENSE, the first series production B-1B strategic bombers have been delivered to Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, where the first heavy bomber squadron equipped with these aircraft is being formed as part of the 96th Air Wing.

The multipurpose B-1B strategic bomber is designed primarily for delivering nuclear strikes against important enemy installations and will replace part of the outdated B-52 bombers in the air wing of the USAF Strategic Air Command. The new aircraft is a monoplane with a variable geometry wing and has the following characteristics: a 3-man crew, maximum takeoff weight of about 215 tons, maximum flight speed (at 12 km) of Mach 1.25, cruising speed of Mach 0.72 (about 850 km per hour), a practical ceiling of over 15 km, combat operating radius of 2,500 km, ferrying range of 11,300 km, and is equipped with four turbofan engines having 14 tons of thrust each.

The maximum operational load is about 57 tons. Depending on the mission, the bomber may carry either 22 AGM-86B cruise missiles (maximum flight range of 2,600 km and a nuclear warhead yield of up to 200 kt), 38 SRAM guided missiles (300 km, 200 kt), or up to 38 nuclear bombs.

Special attention in developing the B-1B was given to reducing the probability of its detection by enemy radars by decreasing the radar cross-section. The USAF plans to obtain 100 B-1B aircraft by 1989 at a cost of \$293 million each. It is expected that the first air squadron of the new bombers will begin alert duty in late 1986.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ON MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN JAPAN

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Dec 85 p 3

[Article by Col V. Rodionov: "Military Preparations in Japan: Where is the 'Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier' Headed?"]

[Text] A course toward a strengthening of militarist preparations within the framework of the Japanese-American military alliance is becoming more and more characteristic of modern Japan's political life. Implementation of this course in this stage is being accomplished under the pretext of the "need to counter the Soviet military threat" on the basis of the idea advanced by Prime Minister Nakasone about turning Japan into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" which would be able to "independently accomplish an ever broader range of combat missions" and take an active part in realizing U.S. aggressive plans in the Far East.

Such a policy fully suits the United States, which considers Japan as a springboard for unfolding military preparations in Asia and the Far East and which is setting up strategic stores of arms and supplies on Japanese territory in case of so-called "extraordinary circumstances." A U.S. armed forces grouping of some 50,000 persons presently is stationed on Japanese territory (this is almost a third of all American troops stationed in the western Pacific); up to 200 combat and auxiliary aircraft of the U.S. Air Force and Navy are permanently based here; a multipurpose carrier group headed by the carrier "Midway" is assigned to Japan's naval bases and ports; and the country's ports receive constant calls by American warships with nuclear weapons aboard, including those equipped with the Tomahawk cruise missiles. The U.S. Armed Forces have over 120 military bases and facilities on Japanese territory, and the Japanese government allocates over one billion dollars a year for their upkeep.

A further increase in Japan's significance as a springboard for the U.S. Armed Forces involves the stationing of F-16 nuclear-weapon-capable aircraft at Misawa Air Base in the northern part of the country, which began in April of this year (over 50 aircraft will be stationed there by 1987). The U.S. command is raising the question of stockpiling heavy weapons on the island of Hokkaido, which would allow the Pentagon to build up the American troop grouping on Japanese territory. According to Japanese newspaper reports, it is planned to build over-the-horizon radars here which would make it possible



to monitor the sea and air space for up to 4,000 km from the country's shores. The main purpose of these radars is to support U.S. Air Force and Navy activities and to conduct electronic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union's far-eastern areas.

Military cooperation is deepening between armed forces of the United States and Japan. For example, a plan was approved in December 1984 for joint actions in case of the appearance of an "extraordinary situation" in the Far East; as shown by this year's events, the U.S. and Japanese armed forces already have begun to test it in practice.

The scale of joint operational and combat training is expanding. Each year there are up to 25 major American-Japanese maneuvers and exercises of air force and naval units; joint ground force exercises, including with the involvement of large and small units of American troops moved to Japan from the Hawaiian Islands and from the continental United States, began in 1982. Exercises are being held more and more often in Japan's northern regions.

Japan's ruling circles are regularly building up national armed forces simultaneously with the expansion in Japanese-American military cooperation. According to foreign press data, at the present time the T/O strength of the Japanese Armed Forces is over 270,000 and their order of battle includes 13 divisions, including one tank division; and there are over 1,000 tanks, more than 900 air force and naval combat and auxiliary aircraft, and up to 170 warships and auxiliary vessels in the inventory. Western specialists believe that Japan has almost come up to the level of Great Britain in ground force strength, and to fourth or fifth place among the 15 countries allied with the United States in the NATO bloc in quantitative indicators of principal weaponry.

The Japanese military-political leadership is stepping up the build-up in military preparations on a coordinated basis with the American administration. This September Japan's Cabinet of Ministers approved a draft program for developing the national armed forces for the period 1986-1990 which provides for a substantial increase in their combat capabilities through purchases of modern weapon systems and military equipment. This program places special emphasis on increasing the strike and offensive capabilities of all branches of the armed forces by outfitting the Ground Forces with new tanks and "shore to ship" cruise missiles, increasing the number of attack aircraft, and arming submarines, surface combatants and naval aviation with various types of missiles. It is planned to appropriate up to 18.4 trillion yen to implement this program; this is almost 1.5 times greater than military expenditures for the previous five years.

The Japanese leadership is accompanying the stepped-up military preparations with a stepped-up campaign aimed at preparing conditions for total abolition of the restrictions deterring Japan's movement along a militarist path. The main argument used is the thesis that the period of postwar regulation basically has ended for Japan and in this connection the existing constitution and other political guidelines which until recently determined the country's development, including in the military sphere (keeping military expenditures within one percent of the gross national product; the policy of three

nonnuclear principles--not to import, manufacture or possess nuclear weapons; the refusal to export weapons, and so on) allegedly have fulfilled their historic role and should be revised. Practical steps also are being taken at the same time in this direction. A special committee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party already has prepared a new draft constitution providing for the abolition of antiwar provisions in the country's basic law. The conservatives raised the question at an extraordinary session of parliament about abolishing the limitation on military expenditures to one percent of the GNP. A new step was taken along the path of "eroding" the three nonnuclear principles and the policy of refusing to export arms as a result of the stationing of American nuclear-weapon-capable aircraft at Misawa Air Base and the signing of an agreement transferring military technology to the United States.

This policy of Japan's ruling circles is encountering ever growing resistance on the part of the country's democratic forces, who understand all the perniciousness of the course toward a rebirth of militarism. As the Japanese newspaper AKAHATA stresses, "these militarist preparations are fraught with stepped-up tension in the Far East and Japan's further involvement in Washington's aggressive strategy despite the people's will." But the "modern samurai" do not wish to heed the sober voices of public opinion. Expansionism, revanshism, and a rebirth of the cult of military force--a relapse of the illness which already once has led militarist Japan to catastrophe--are being seen more and more clearly in the politics of the Japanese leadership.

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## AFGHANISTAN

### FIGHTING CONTINUES IN THE KHYBER PASS AREA

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jan 86 p 5

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Maj A. Oliynik: "Report From Afghanistan: Khyber--Fighting Continues"]

[Text] Kabul, 3 Jan--The bazaar in the little town of Bara last December was crowded and noisy in the eastern manner. According to age-old tradition, potters and carpetmakers had been selling their wares here since early morning, and throngs of women and children scurried between the market rows. Suddenly all accesses to the bazaar square were cordoned off by subunits of the regular Pakistani Army: a so-called "pacification" action had begun. Murderers in military uniform burst into the dukany [shops] and the residences, submachinegunned the civilian residents from point-blank range, beat them unmercifully with butts and crushed them with tank treads. Some 80 persons were killed in several hours of the bloody slaughter. All of them belonged to the Afridi tribe. The father of Ahmed Said also was a victim of the punitive troops. Ahmed managed to make his way into Afghanistan after all that happened and he told a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent about these events.

The bloody massacre at the Bara bazaar is just an episode in the policy of genocide which the Pakistani militarists are implementing against the populace of the free-tribes zone near the Khyber Pass. The blood of patriots from the Pushtun tribes of the Afridi and Shinwari is being shed here for the second month now. The regime of Zia-ul-Haq, who decided to "teach a lesson" to Pushtun tribes refusing to let dushman bands and caravans of arms for them across their territory, fell on them with fire and sword.

According to the BAKHTAR AGENCY, regular Pakistani Army units continue to escalate aggression in the Khyber zone. Many Pushtun settlements have been wiped from the face of the earth. A state of bloody terror reigns in army-occupied areas. Hundreds of Pushtun patriots have been thrown into prisons.

Islamabad is attempting with all its might and main to crush the Pushtuns, but their fighting detachments are offering staunch resistance to the punitive troops. According to reports filtering out of the combat zone, Pakistani troop losses now have reached 1500 and hundreds of servicemen have been taken prisoner.

Other Pushtun tribes on both sides of the so-called "Durand Line"--the Afghan-Pakistani border--are fervently supporting the just struggle of the Afridis and Shinwaris. For example, jirgahs [councils of family heads and notables] of the Waziri tribe held in northern Waziristan demanded that the Islamabad regime respect the historic rights of the Pushtun tribes and immediately remove troops from the Khyber district. Conferences of elders of the Salarzai and Atmankheyl tribes also were held and expressed solidarity with the struggle of the Afridis and Shinwaris. Fighting detachments are being formed in the Mohmand tribe.

It was learned that Pakistan makes wide use of Afghan counterrevolutionaries in punitive operations against the Pushtun tribes. Zia-ul-Haq himself spoke at one of their leaders' assemblages. He called on them to "help government troops pacify the Pushtun tribes." Following this call, dushman [enemies] from three counterrevolutionary groupings cruelly dealt with the civilian population of the kishlaks of Kamdaka and Shinokh. New "volunteer detachments" of dushman are being hastily knocked together in Peshawar to put down resistance in the free-tribes zone.

All these facts indicate that, with reliance on U.S. help, Pakistan not only is supporting the dushman to fight achievements of the April revolution, but it is also actively using bandits to suppress the just cause of the Pushtun patriots.

The Afridi and Shinwari tribes continue to defend their freedom. They cannot be broken! But the situation in the Khyber Pass area remains extremely tense.

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CSO: 1801/94



11 April 1986

## AFGHANISTAN

## MOSCOW: PATHAN TRIBES REBEL AGAINST ISLAMABAD

LD112130 Moscow World Service in English 1531 GMT 11 Feb 86

[Text] The hotbed of another armed conflict is growing in the area populated by Pathan tribes in Pakistan. The Islamabad regime has been trying hard to hush up the affair. The tribes of Afridi and Shinwari that rose in rebellion earlier have been joined by the tribe of (Sagdi), north of Miram Shah, near the border with the Khost district of the Afghan province of Paktia. Our correspondent reports from Khost:

The tribe of (Sagdi) has joined the tribes of Afridi and Shinwari living in the area of the Khyber Pass in their refusal to give passage through their lands to terrorist bands. They have also demanded the removal of camps for training counterrevolutionaries and arms stockpiles from their territories. The demands have caused a spate of anger from Islamabad and its overseas backers. It is an open secret that the area in question has for a long time been used as a major stronghold to send mercenary bands in Afghanistan. What is more, Washington has pinned far-reaching plans on the capture of Khost. It was going to seize not only Khost itself but the whole of Paktia Province, with the aim of creating a sort of buffer state in the territory of Afghanistan. Should the plan materialize the United States would get an opportunity to give open support to the Afghan counterrevolution.

However, these schemes have failed. The Afghan Army has inflicted a crushing defeat on the bandits. More than 2,400 counterrevolutionaries were killed in the Khost operation. The counterrevolutionary leader Jellaloddin and the leader of the counterrevolutionary Islamic Party of Afghanistan, Golboddin, have fled to Pakistan.

The Islamabad authorities, in a bid to protect the bandits, have sent army units against the (Sagdi) tribe. The fierce clashes that followed took a toll of scores of lives on both sides. Civil servants of the (Sagdi) tribe working in Miram Shah and the nearby areas have announced a boycott of the government. The neighboring Pathan tribes of Masud, (Dawar) and Waziri at a joint assembly have voiced solidarity with the struggle of the (Sagdi) tribe and sent a delegation with an official protest to Islamabad.

At the moment, several thousand Pakistani troops with heavy artillery and tanks have been massed in the Miram Shah area. With the help of Afghan

counterrevolutionaries they have blockaded the area populated by the (Sagdi) tribe and stopped the supplies of food and other essentials. They have also assumed control over all roads between the tribes in the Miram Shah area.

However, the Pathan are not going to surrender. They have held a supreme assembly to voice their determination to continue resistance to the troops of the Islamabad regime, that have intruded into the area of free tribes. Detachments of the Pathan tribes have delivered serious blows on the bands of Afghan counterrevolutionaries involved in the punitive operations. There have been reports of heavy fighting between detachments of the Pathan tribe of (Tora wazir) in the Kurram area. Dozens of bandits have been killed in the areas of Bazar-e-Sadr, Parachinar and (Tukteli) and also on the (Suraqi) road.

The Pathans are stepping up their resistance to punitive operations by Islamabad. If the regime doesn't stop persecuting the Pathans to please Washington tension inside Pakistan itself will increase.

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CSO: 1812/90

AFGHANISTAN

BALUCHIS ATTACK AFGHAN, PAKISTANI 'COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES'

LD292328 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 29 Jan 86

[Text] According to a report from BAKHTAR, a number of Baluchi tribes living in Pakistan have joined the open armed struggle against Pakistani troops and their mercenaries, who are continuing large-scale aggressive operations in the Khyber mountain pass. And in the area of (?Jannahrud), a camp of "maletia" was attacked--that is what the Pakistani mercenaries are called. The Baluchis took more than 60 people prisoner. In the suburbs of Quetta, detachments of Baluchis took prisoner and disarmed more than 100 Afghan counterrevolutionaries, and "maletia," who were redeploying. Several tanks and armored personnel carriers belonging to the Pakistani Army were destroyed. Also, the Kakar Pushtun tribe, living in Pakistani Baluchistan, attacked a camp of Afghan counterrevolutionaries in the region of Badhani.

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AFGHANISTAN

PRAVDA: PAKISTAN BORDER HOSTILITIES SPREADING

PM241431 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 86 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Rebuffed by Pushtuns"]

[Text] Kabul, 23 Feb--There has been a sharp deterioration in the situation in (Kurram) agency (Pakistan's Northwest border province), where the people have followed the inhabitants of Khyber agency and risen up in open struggle against the Afghan counterrevolutionary gangs and Islamabad's troops. According to reports arriving here, clashes in the past few days between inhabitants of (Kurram) and bandits have resulted in dozens of counter-revolutionaries being killed or wounded. The Pakistani goons have also suffered losses of men and equipment. Protests have become particularly large scale in the population center of Bazar Sadda, where dozens of civilians were killed recently when bombs planted by Afghan bandits exploded. In its attempts to suppress the people's resistance, the Islamabad military regime brought into the agency extra military subunits which carried out mass repression against the population.

(Godratulla Varakzay)--A prominent religious figure in another of the seven agencies in the Northwest border province--has sent a message to UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar. The message sharply condemns the Pakistani military authorities' policy, aimed at suppressing the Pushtun tribes' freedom and traditional rights.

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AFGHANISTAN

BAKHTAR ON DRA-PAKISTAN BORDER ACTIVITY

LD172251 Moscow TASS in English 1854 GMT 17 Feb 86

[Text] Kabul, 17 Feb, TASS--Armed formations of Pashtun tribes continue to put up resistance to Pakistani troops and to bands of Afghan counterrevolutionaries that are acting together with Pakistani forces which have invaded the tribes-inhabited territory. The BAKHTAR News Agency reports that in Jamrud area a detachment of Afridi tribe has made an attack on an ammunition depot of Pakistani paramilitary police. Seventeen policemen were taken prisoner. Another Pashtun detachment has attacked a Pakistani army post in Bagiari area. Several troopers were killed and wounded.

A jirgah of Pashtun tribes has taken place in Tauda Mena area, with more than two thousand people taking part, the BAKHTAR News Agency reports. The jirgah decided to continue to repulse the Islamabad regime's aggression in the zone of the tribes and to prevent the Afghan counterrevolutionaries from penetrating the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) across the Pushtun-inhabited areas.

Being deprived of an opportunity to penetrate Afghan territory through the territory of the Afridi and Shinwari tribes, the bandit groupings based nearby started to "clear matters up between themselves" by means of weapons. According to reports from Pakistan's border areas, fighting between warring bands takes place practically every day over there in camps for the training of counterrevolutionaries. Civilians suffer as a result of the strife between counterrevolutionaries. Local observers point out that the Pakistani military regime is planning to make use of the developments as a pretext for a further build-up of military presence in the zone of the tribes.

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AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW FEATURES AID TO KABUL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

LD152313 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 15 Feb 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast, A. Petrova report]

[Text] Our country renders a great deal of aid to Afghanistan in developing civil aviation. [Video shows airport identified on caption as Kabul international airport; an Aeroflot TU-154 landing, and another plane landing at dusk; the landing lights on runway; and terminal, with Boeing 727 being handled] Work has been carried out with the assistance of Soviet specialists on rebuilding the take-off zone. This includes a landing and take-off runway 3.5 km long, assembly of a modern lighting and signalling system and an emergency service. Two comfortable new terminal buildings have been built for local and international lines, as well as an automatic telephone station and, aircraft overhaul hangers.

The day of demonstration flights on the Soviet Yak-42 was a holiday. Many Kabul citizens came to the airport: Afghan and Soviet leaders, the DRA minister of civil aviation, pilots, and numerous passengers. [Video shows aerial shot of airport with at least five Yak-42, Afghans in audience, officials gathering on tarmac, Yak-42 marked 316 il-76 taking off.]

In whatever sphere of life in Afghanistan we speak of today, the Kabul international airport occupies a special place. It is special because there are no railways in Afghanistan, and the only main road leading from the capital to the northern border of the country is difficult to use in winter due to snow drifts on the mountain passes. Whatever time of day or night you come to the airport, there are always hundreds of passengers for domestic and international lines. [Video shows interior of Yak-42 cockpit, passengers boarding a Boeing 727. Petrova at side of runway, then interviewing A. Adzhmal, identified on screen as minister of aviation, in the cockpit] The Kabul international airport, in spite of shelling and sabotage, lives, works, and is under construction. It can today handle the most modern types of aircraft. Every 20-25 seconds an aircraft takes off or lands.

[Begin Adzhmal recording] My heart is overflowing with pride and tenderness when I come down over Kabul and see my own home airport, modern and most dear to me. We have excellent pilots who carry out important internal and international trips which are so necessary to the country. Now, with the fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union, so much has been done that we are growing wings. Like all people on earth, all that we need is peace. [end recording]

## AFGHANISTAN

### SOVIET ARMY MEDICS' DRA SERVICE DESCRIBED

PM131637 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 86 second edition p 2

[First part of article by Special correspondent Colonel V. Filatov under the rubric "From an Afghan Notebook": "Scale of Thinking"; first two grafs are unattributed introduction]

[Excerpts] 1. Experience Does Not Leave for the Reserve

Many of us are people of the plain. Afghanistan is a country of mountains. We are accustomed to looking into the distance, along a straight line, to the very horizon. Here, in Afghanistan, everything is raised and above us, seemingly close--it is as if you are standing before an endless and enormously high Great Wall of China, which at times approaches your shoulder, and at times moves away to a distance of a few city blocks. One has to readjust one's range of vision, perception, sense of distance, and means of conveyance --these are mountains, after all.... This is, as they say, an introduction for tourists from the plains. What about us, the military? Do we have to readjust, to review things that are customary, seemingly finally defined long ago? This comes from a conversation with those who are now serving in Afghanistan and who before that were serving in a central region of Russia.

To convey experience and share knowledge: I heard this from almost everyone whose time had come to transfer to the reserves. It is true that those who do not share their experience with the new, young people make for inactivity and delays. This is also relevant, incidentally, to those who serve in our military districts, the fleets, and the groups of forces. Share experience and teach the person following you, so as not to become a tree without fruit; this applies to enlisted men, NCO's, officers, and generals...

Experience is always a bit of discovery, otherwise why would you pass it on? There is a table near the radio under our camouflage netting; on it, there is a telephone set; at the table sits Lieutenant Colonel of the Medical Service Lev Vitalyevich Novopashennyy. I have known him for a few days now. That is a long time by local standards. He is a very kind person. Always in a good mood. "A morose physician is worse for those around him than an infection virus," Novopashennyy tells me in confidence, and I am convinced that he is a very good physician.

Novopashenny has just telephoned our military hospital in Kabul. Lev Vitalyevich told his colleagues that a soldier was wounded here, that he had been evacuated from a combat area, that a helicopter had just picked up the wounded man, and that he would be at the hospital in about 40 minutes. From what Novopashenny says, I understand that everything is ready at the hospital to admit the wounded man, which is what the lieutenant colonel wanted on the telephone.

For Novopashenny, the wounded man is his heartfelt concern; for him, the professional, he is an object of real scientific research, with concrete conclusions and recommendations for those who will provide medical support when Novopashenny is gone. Incidentally, no military specialist newly arrived in Afghanistan is now permitted to fulfill his service duties without, besides everything else, also thoroughly studying the records his predecessor has left him. This is a farsighted thing to do...

"In combat when fire and explosions are all around, medics have always been alongside the men. How can it be otherwise? They have always displayed a very real art in ways of saving the wounded right on the battlefield and in ways of immediately evacuating them to hospitals," Novopashenny says. "There was an incident in the mountains recently: A soldier in Captain A. Levko's company was wounded. His comrades carried him down from an altitude of 3,500 meters. With the wounded man getting worse, the sapper led them through a minefield, the direct way, to shorten the route to the helicopter pad. Of course, he removed mines along the way. They got to the pad in time, after all. A helicopter picked up their comrade there and took him to hospital. The life of a wounded man often depends on how quickly he can be delivered from the battlefield to the medical specialists.

"I recall that I was once in a helicopter on its way to a wounded man. Although a helicopter is quick, the climb up this mountain was long and tense. If one considers the capabilities of a helicopter, the mountain turned out to be the same for it as a steeple is for a person: high, and with nowhere to sit. Moreover, a battle was under way nearby. The pilot managed to put the machine down on one wheel... the wounded man was picked up... For the pilots, it was truly a skillful job, a circus number. The squadron commander would later tell me that not everyone in the squadron could perform such a "number."

"Under no circumstances could a situation arise where a wounded man would not be evacuated from the battlefield in time; that is, from mountaintops, summit passes, or ravines. No one here thinks about himself, about his own safety, but only about the other guy, the wounded man," Novopashenny continues.

"Every mountain area, incidentally, has a law: If a slightly wounded man is not delivered to the hospital in time, he may become seriously wounded."

Lev Vitalyevich places in front of me notebooks describing the transportation of wounded men from mountains to hospital. This is a priceless legacy! From everything I have heard, seen, and read from Novopashenny, I have gained an even greater sense of gratitude and thankfulness for the merciful work of our medics in Afghanistan. They know their job very well.



They know how to do it very well today and very well tomorrow... The commanders listen to their advice very carefully. I saw for myself how the reports of Doctor Novopashenny to the commander have almost immediately become the strictest orders of the commander.

Later the physician and I had another kind of talk. We recalled other periods, other eras, and other wars. Wars on the plains. And wars in the mountains. What, for instance, did they use then instead of the modern helicopter to evacuate the wounded?

"The horse," Novopashenny says instinctively.

"You're joking?"

And Lev Vitalyevich tells me about the Russian physician Turovskiy, who at one time seriously studied the problem of evacuating wounded from almost inaccessible mountain areas. The result of his research was the invention of a special saddle that is named after him: the Turovskiy saddle. Soviet specialists, including Savenko and Timofeyev studied the same problem in the 1930's and 1940's. They created a number of one-horse pack stretchers on a saddle. A wounded man was safely and comfortably tied to the saddle. The horse replaced four to six bearers... Its descent along any mountain path--or even without one--was much quicker and more deft. And how important to a platoon are four to six bearers.

Horses... Turovskiy saddles... Savenko saddles... Timofeyev saddles... The end of the 20th century... But most amazing was that Novopashenny had seen a great number of these saddles in some old medical warehouses...

Is experience always a bit of discovery? Perhaps. But there is also this saying: Something new is basically something old that has been forgotten.

"So, are you medics for horses, or not?" I joke.

"For them all the way..."

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CSO: 1801/131

AFGHANISTAN

SOVIET AIRMAN WINS POSTHUMOUS AWARD IN AFGHANISTAN

PM141333 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Feb 86 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel M. Zemskov: "The Height of Courage," under the rubric "Site of the Heroic Deed--Afghanistan"]

[Excerpt] Lieutenant Colonel Kovalev arrived in Afghanistan as an experienced pilot and squadron commander, and as a skillful instructor of young pilots.

The skies of Afghanistan are a rigorous, arduous test of skill, courage, and combat maturity for any pilot. Lieutenant Colonel Kovalev sensed this on his very first flights. The mountain conditions, hot climate, and the air's high dust content demanded skill and total selflessness.

He succeeded in performing a considerable number of tasks in the ancient land of Afghanistan. On his very first flights he saw destroyed villages and burn-in crops, blown-up bridges, mosques, and schools. He witnessed the suffering and grief of the industrious Afghan people and saw the cruelty with which the rebels deal with those who are building a new life. And he strove through his exemplary service to do everything possible to help the people repel armed raids from outside [Iz-za kordona], and he carried out all his tasks to support subunits and units of the Afghan army to the best of his abilities.

During the months he spent in the DRA Nikolay Kovalev thoroughly succeeded in proving his worth. This is attested by an extract from the officer's service report:

"On one flight, while carrying out air reconnaissance at the request of the command group of an Afghan formation, he personally detected and destroyed an arms and ammunition caravan whose protective escort opened intensive fire on him. Lt Col Kovalev destroyed the caravan carrying a large consignment of weapons and ammunition, which was heading into the province. In the performance of all operational flights he proved himself to be a bold, coolheaded, and courageous pilot..."

And here are some lines from the statement on conferring on Lt Col Kovalev the title Hero of the Soviet Union:

"He particularly distinguished himself on the flights he made in the Konar Province region. When carrying out air attacks on Dushman storage sites and strong points, by intelligently organizing the attack maneuver he destroyed the objectives on the first approach... On 1 June, while carrying out an attack on a carefully disguised storage dump, he came under intensive Dushman fire, as a result of which the helicopter was damaged, went out of control, crashed into a mountain, and exploded..."

The inadequate lines of the document cannot convey all the intensity of that bitter battle, the last battle in which Lt Col Kovalev participated. The Afghan Army subunit was surrounded by bandits. A subunit of Soviet troops came to its assistance. But the bandits tightened the ring of encirclement, constantly replenishing battle reserves from the dump concealed in the mountains. Lt Col Kavalev--who had been given the mission of destroying the dump containing the ammunition--honorably fulfilled the task set and detected and destroyed the dump on his very first approach.

Coming out of the attack, the helicopter was hit by heavy machine gun fire. For another minute, a whole minute, Kovalev maintained contact with the ground, trying to gain altitude and lift the helicopter out of the danger zone. But the helicopter no longer submitted to the pilot's will, rushing headlong toward the mountain ridge...

There, on the heights, in the mountains of a country friendly to us, Lt Col Nikolay Kovalev died. And these heights are the height of the courage shown by the Soviet serviceman honorably fulfilling their sacred military and international duty in the land of Afghanistan...

Four courage and heroism displayed in the performance of his military duty to render international assistance to the Afghan people, Lt Col Nikolay Ivanovich Kovalev has been awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumous).

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